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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

RICHARD WILLIS JONES,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070403-CA

:

INTRODUCTION
When read together, the plain language of Utah's venue statute and burden of
proof statute say that objections of improper place of trial are waived by the defendant
unless made before trial, but objections to proof of venue are not. This is because the
State carries the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence at trial.
Thus, because Jones objected to proof of venue at trial, not to improper place of trial, this
Court should hold that he did not waive his objection by raising it at the close of the
State's case. Moreover, for the reasons outlined in his opening brief, Jones asks this
Court to reverse because the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to
reopen its case in order to put on additional evidence regarding venue.

ARGUMENT
JONES DID NOT WAIVE HIS OBJECTION TO THE STATE'S FAILURE
TO PROVE VENUE AT TRIAL BECAUSE THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF
THE UTAH CODE REQUIRES THE STATE TO PROVE VENUE AT
TRIAL AND ALLOWS THE DEFENDANT TO OBJECT TO PROOF OF
VENUE AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S CASE
"'Under [Utah's] rules of statutory construction, we look first to the statute's plain
language."5 State v. Gallegos, 2007 UT 81,^12, 171 P.3d 426 (citation omitted). This
Court will "'read the plain language of a statute . . . as a whole and interpret its provisions
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute/" IcL (citation omitted).
The Jurisdiction and Venue part of the Utah Criminal Code outlines the proper
place for trial. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201, -202 (Supp. 2007). Within that part,
the venue statute says, "All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a
defendant unless made before trial." Id. at § 76-1-202(2). By contrast, the Burden of
Proof part dictates the burdens of proof required to convict at trial. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 76-1-501, -504 (2003). It says, "The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not
elements of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence." Id.
at §76-1-501(3).
Read together, the plain language of these statutes says that "objections of
improper place of trial arc waived by a defendant unless made before trial." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-202(2). To sustain its burden of proof at trial, however, the State still must
establish venue "by a preponderance of the evidence." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3).
The State analogizes venue to jurisdiction and argues that venue does not have to
be proved at trial because jurisdiction does not have to be proved at trial. See Aple. Br. at
2

12-13. Unlike the venue statute, however, the plain language of the jurisdiction statute
makes jurisdiction a question for the judge. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(8). It says,
"The judge shall determine jurisdiction." W. The Utah Legislature could have included a
similar provision in the venue statute, but it did not. This Court should presume the
Legislature's omission was purposeful. See Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75/ft23, 11 P.3d
277 (wC[T]he well-established principle of statutory construction requirefes] us to give
meaning, where possible, to all provisions of a statute."); Biddle v. Washington Terrace
City, 1999 UT 110,f 14, 993 P.2d 875 ("[0]missions in statutory language should 'be
taken note of and given effect.'" (citation omitted)); State v. Jacobs, 2006 UT App
356,^7, 144 P.3d 226 (cu[W]e must assume that each term included in the [statute] was
used advisedly,' and because ; "statutory construction presumes that the expression of one
should be interpreted as the exclusion of another[,J" . . . we should give effect to any
omission in the [statute's] language by presuming that the omission is purposeful.'"
(citations omitted)); Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:02 (6th
ed. 2002) ("c[W]here a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision,
the omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is
significant to show that a different intention existed.'").
Although it is not necessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute, other
jurisdictions have reached similar results when interpreting statutory language similar to
ours. See Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:06 ("Decisions from other
states construing similar statutes are likewise considered helpful as persuasive
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precedents, although not controlling."); id at §§ 52:01, 52:03 (indicating that it is
appropriate to use similar statutes from other jurisdictions to aid in interpretation).
When interpreting statutory language similar to ours, the Montana Supreme Court
reached a plain language interpretation like the one that Jones urges this Court to reach.
Under Montana law, "objections that a charge is filed in the improper county are waived
by a defendant unless made before the first witness is sworn at the time of trial." Mont.
Code Ann. § 46-3-111 (2007). In State v. Johnson, 848 P.2d 496 (Mont. 1993), the
Montana Supreme Court held, "Although venue is not an element of the crime, it is a
jurisdictional fact that must be proven at trial just as any other material element."
Johnson, 848 P.2d at 498 (citation omitted). Thus, "[u]nlike a claim that venue is
improper, which must be raised before trial according to § 46-3-111, MCA, the issue of
whether the State has satisfied its burden, may be raised for the first time on appeal." Id.
(citation omitted).
The Louisiana Court of Appeal reached the same plain language interpretation
when it interpreted statutory language more restrictive than ours or Montana's. Under
Louisiana law, "[i]mproper venue shall be raised in advance of trial by motion to quash,
and shall be tried by the judge alone. Venue shall not be considered an essential element
to be proven by the state at trial, rather it shall be a jurisdictional matter to be proven by
the state by a preponderance of the evidence and decided by the court in advance of
trial." State v. Powell 598 So.2d 454, 467 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). Citing
this language in Powell, the Louisiana Court of Appeal concluded, "In contrast to the

4

claim of improper venue, which must be raised by motion to quash, the claim of no proof
of venue may be raised by motion for directed verdict." Id. (citation omitted).
Indeed, many jurisdictions distinguish between the "objection to 'improper
venue,'" which must be raised before trial, and the "objection to a lack of proof of
venue," which is generally raised at the close of the State's case. Wayne R. LaFave et al.,
4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(h) at n.304 (3d ed. 2007); see, e.g., United States v. RuelasArreguin, 219 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2000) ("If a defect in venue is clear on the face
of the indictment, a defendant's objection must be raised before the government has
completed its case," but "as numerous circuits have recognized, if the venue defect is not
evidence on the face of the indictment, a defendant may challenge venue in a motion for
acquittal at the close of the government's case." (citations omitted)); United States v.
Daniels, 5 F.3d 495, 496 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding defendant did not waive "by failing to
object to venue prior to trial" because "'indictment contained] a proper allegation of
venue" so that he had "no notice of a defect of venue until the Government rest[ed] its
case"); United States v. Menendez, 612 F.2d 51, 55 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting pretrial
objection required when "indictment or statements by the prosecutor clearly reveal th[e]
defect"); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding "improper
venue" objection "is waived if not presented before the close of the Government's case
and perhaps if not presented before commencement of trial," but motion to acquit where
venue "is not sustained by the evidence" is not waived because "defendant has no notice
of a defect of venue until the Government rests without proving what it has alleged"),
overruled on other grounds, United States v. Lawson, 653 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1981);
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Jenkins v. United States, 392 F.2d 303, 305-06 (10th Cir. 1968) (holding pretrial
objection was not required as a result of what defendant knew of government's case from
previous trial because defendant had no way of knowing that proof would be the same at
the second trial and the indictment on its face was "complete as to venue"); State v.
Blooflat, 524 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (holding "objections to improper
venue are deemed waived where a defendant does not object to the venue before trial,"
but state still has "burden of proving venue" at trial); State v. Haase, 446 N.W.2d 62, 65
(S.D. 1989) ("Where lack of proper venue is apparent on the face of an indictment, venue
objections are waived if not made prior to trial," but "when an indictment contains a
proper allegation of venue so that a defendant has no notice of a defect of venue until the
government rests its case, the objection is timely if made at the close of evidence."); State
v. Dent, 869 P.2d 392, 400 (Wash. 1994) (holding venue must be raised at omnibus
hearing unless evidence introduced at trial raises a venue question "for the first time").
In fact, holding that "venue is not simply a prerequisite that the defendant may
choose to challenge pretrial," but also "part of the case that the prosecution must prove at
trial," would put Utah in line with the "federal system and the vast majority of the states."
LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g) ("Less than a dozen states treat venue in much
the same manner as other procedural prerequisites for prosecution.").
This treatment of venue is broadly followed because it reflects sound policy. By
requiring the defendant to object to improper venue before trial, this interpretation
protects the "'defendant from being required to stand trial in a distant and unduly
burdensome locale.'" Aple. Br. at 10-11 (citation omitted). It also saves the State from
6

"'incurring] the time and expense of conducting a trial"' in an improper place. Aple.
Br. at 11 (citation omitted).
By also requiring the State to prove venue at trial, however, this interpretation has
the further benefit of ensuring that the State carries its full burden. The "federal system
and the vast majority of the states" recognize venue as a fact that must be proved at trial.
LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g). Some of these jurisdictions consider venue to
be "an 'element of the crime' to be treated no differently than the substantive elements of
the offense." Id. Many others, however, like Utah, reject the notion that venue is an
element. Id Still, these jurisdictions require venue to be proved at trial, describing it
variously "as: 'a jurisdictional fact put in issue by a plea of not guilty'; [a] 'material
allegation of the indictment' which must be proven along with other indictment
allegations; . . . and an 'issuable fact' most appropriately addressed in the course of the
proof of the offense and presented to the finder of fact." Id. & n.245 (citations omitted).
The State claims that use of the preponderance of the evidence standard suggests
venue is a pretrial question for the judge because the preponderance of the evidence
standard is usually reserved for "[cjourts, not juries." Aple. Br. at 9. This claim is not
supported by any citations. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (stating briefs must contain
reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority); Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT
98,Y7, 17 P.3d 1122 ("Failure to provide any analysis or legal authority constitutes
inadequate briefing." (citations omitted)); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah
1998) (declaring that an issue is inadequately briefed when the "overall analysis of the
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing
7

court"). It is also contradicted by the fact that juries review civil matters under the
preponderance of the evidence standard. See Johns v. Shulsen, 717 P.2d 1336, 1338
(Utah 1986) ("It is universally recognized that the standard of proof in civil actions is by
a preponderance of the evidence." (citation omitted)).
More important to this case, Utah's requirement "that the facts supporting venue
only need be established by a preponderance of the evidence" is shared by "[t]he federal
courts and a substantial number of state courts." LaFave, 4 Criminal Procedure § 16.1(g).
Of all these jurisdictions, only "[aj few states consider proof of venue at trial an issue for
the judge rather than the jury." Id, at n.246 (citations omitted).
Unlike other jurisdictions, it appears from the case law that Utah courts have not
had the opportunity to address this issue. Despite this, existing case law is largely in line
with the plain language reading of sections 76-1-202 and 76-1-501 that says "objections
of improper place of trial are waived . . . unless made before trial," but objections to
proof of venue are not because the State carries the burden of proving venue "by a
preponderance of the evidence" at trial. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-202(2), 76-1-501(3).
In State v. Bailey, 282 P.2d 339 (Utah 1955), for example, the defendant
contended "that the state failed to prove venue and the verdict of the jury [was],
therefore, contrary to the evidence." Bailey, 282 P.2d at 340. Without finding it
important to say whether the defendant objected to venue before trial, our supreme court
addressed the defendant's contention and held that the trial court "correctly" instructed
the jury that it had to "find that the said driving occurred in Garfield County, as charged."
Id at 341; see also State v. Mitchell 278 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah 1955) (same).
8

Similarly, in State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), the defendant argued that
"[vjenue was improper in that the crime occurred in Salt Lake County but the trial was
held in Utah County," and that "[t]he state failed to prove all the elements of the offense."
Cauble, 563 P.2d at 776. Regarding the improper venue challenge, our supreme court
held that the issue was waived because "the first objection to place of trial was not made
until after the prosecution had rested its case." Id. at 777. Regarding proof of the
elements at trial, however, the Court examined the evidence, including the evidence
relating to venue, and concluded the defendant's claim was "entirely without merit." Id
at 779. In so doing, the Court "pointed out that venue is not an element of the offense
and need be proved merely by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (citing Mitchell,
278 P.2d 618); see Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3). But see State v. Lovell 758 P.2d 909,
911 (Utah 1988) (declining to reach defendant's objection to the "jury instructions on
venue" because he waived the issue by not objecting before trial and because defendant
was not prejudiced).
Thus, this Court should hold that Jones did not waive his objection to the State's
failure to prove venue at trial. Utah law says "objections of improper place of trial are
waived by a defendant unless made before trial." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-202(2) (Supp.
2007). Jones' objection, however, did not concern proper place of trial; it concerned the
State's failure to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence at trial. Because Utah
law requires the State to establish venue "by a preponderance of the evidence" at trial,
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(3), this Court should consider the merits of Jones' challenge
on appeal. Moreover, for the reasons outlined in his opening brief, Jones asks this Court
9

to reverse because the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the State to reopen
its case in order to put on additional evidence regarding venue. See Aplt. Br. at 6-13.

CONCLUSION
Jones respectfully requests this Court to reverse his conviction for one count of
unlawful possession of a controlled substance.
siSUBMITTED this _ 3 j _ day of January, 2008.

s

-&--JO--1*

LORI J. SEPPI
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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